According to some reports, a strike by the AFU on the Novofedorivka military airfield in occupied Crimea on August 9, 2022 (and there is no doubt that it would be a strike) confused all the plans of the Russian aggressors. If before the strike on the airfield in Novofedorovka they had plans to attack from the "Kherson bridgehead" on the right bank of the Dnieper to Mykolaiv and Odessa, now without air cover and with partially destroyed bridges across the Dnieper it became problematic.

 Moreover, it has become known that after the strike on Novofedorovka in the next 2 days about a thousand soldiers have already been withdrawn from the Kherson bridgehead (out of about 20 thousand that risk being blocked across the Dnipro in the event of complete destruction of bridges and crossings by the AFU).

According to the Kremlin snuffbox telegram channel's source in the General Staff, the withdrawal of troops from the city will continue. Perhaps not all of the approximately 20,000-strong group will be withdrawn. According to Vladimir Putin's idea, about 5,000 troops with a minimum of equipment will be left to defend Kherson on the right bank of the Dnieper. They will be supported by artillery from the left bank and possibly aviation.

"According to the president's plan, these soldiers will try to hold off the Ukrainian army's offensive for as long as possible. As a result, all of them will be killed or captured, but they will buy time. Our army in southern Ukraine will regroup and be ready for new offensives," the source claims. Asked whether it was worth sacrificing so many military personnel, he said: "The president believes it is worth it. Otherwise we will lose not only Kherson".

The position of the Russian occupation army in Ukraine is difficult. Surrendering Kherson, even as a "goodwill gesture" (as the Kremlin propaganda previously represented the withdrawal of the Russian army from the Kiev, Chernihiv and Sumy regions, and later also from Snake Island), would deal a huge blow to the prestige of the Kremlin authorities. Even the most deceived by propaganda will realize that "something is wrong" and that the war is leading the Russian Federation to ignominious defeats.

As a result, the Kremlin urgently needs "victories".

As a result, the Kremlin urgently needs "victories". There is no way to show them to the public in Ukraine. The "forced" capture of the village of Peski near occupied Donetsk, which the Russian army has in fact been storming since 2014, does not impress the public (until February 2022, the village was stormed by the Russian military as " DPR militants," and in recent months it was simply "demolished" by massive artillery fire).

No new "victories", such as the capture of the small town of Lisichansk (a town of less than 100,000 inhabitants), are in sight for the Russian army in the coming months. Even the Russian army cannot take the even smaller town of Bakhmut, although it has been storming it for more than a month. There is nothing to "compensate" in the public mind for the very likely loss of Kherson.

And then the Kremlin recalled its past "great victories", in particular the much-publicised "brilliant victory in the five-day war" against Georgia. Dmitry Medvedev has already managed to make "lunge" against Georgia and Kazakhstan, calling these countries "non-existing states" where, they say, Russia should go.

The fact that both Georgia and Kazakhstan are in danger follows from the information recently published by telegram channel "General SVR":

"Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday ( August 11) during an operational meeting via videoconference with representatives of the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation highlighted the lack of promised high-profile and speedy victories in Ukraine. The participants in the meeting tried to speak in an exculpatory manner but were rudely interrupted by the president. Putin asked a direct question demanding an honest answer:

 "What results can we expect by early September?" After hearing a few answers, which can be summed up as "No big wins right now. Be alive." Putin concluded the meeting. Later, the president discussed problems at the front with several people from his inner circle and, separately, with Yuri Kovalchuk.

In the evening, Putin held another meeting via videoconference, which was attended by two representatives of the leadership of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, the head of one of the services of the FSB, the director of the SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev. They discussed the same problems of the lack of convincing victories at the front and possible ways of solving these problems. Putin personally introduced the possibility of a more convincing "special military operation" in parallel on the territory of a third state, where a victorious result could be "guaranteed" and thus shift the focus away from the Ukrainian front. The discussion of this proposal lasted for more than an hour and in the end Putin instructed Patrushev to lead the preparation of plans for a "special operation" on the territory of Kazakhstan and Georgia. This means two separate plans, one for Kazakhstan and one for Georgia. Both are to be submitted to the president by the first of September.

Putin, in the presence of several people, has effectively admitted for the first time that the military conflict in Ukraine is not just not going according to plan (which, in fact, everyone knows and there is no need for a special confession from the president), but is becoming a problem for him personally and requires urgent measures to resolve it. Putin sees the "solution" in creating a new "controlled chaos" where he will be the undisputed winner.  To go to all lengths to actually open a second front is delusional and destructive not only for Putin, but for the country as well, but who's to stop him, he's 'the boss'."

Georgia appears to be in real danger. And the worse things go for the Kremlin in Ukraine in the near future, the greater the danger. Russia's loss of Kherson, which would be an undeniable victory for Ukraine, would dramatically increase the likelihood that the Kremlin would engage in a new adventure with a "small victorious war".

That said, Georgia is in much greater danger here than Kazakhstan, since aggression against that country requires China's "consent," which is unlikely to be forthcoming. And the military potential of Kazakhstan is much greater than that of Georgia. Plus, the Russian Federation will face the danger of "frontline" of several thousand kilometres, which it is unrealistic to cover without massive mobilization.

Small Georgia in the minds of the "Kremlin strategists" is a much more convenient theatre for "victorious war". In addition, its occupation provides a "corridor to Armenia", something the powerful Armenian lobby is dreaming of. And the Kremlin can always find a pretext for aggression against Georgia from already seized "bridgeheads" in the form of the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region. All the more that there are also separatists in Georgia, the so-called "oppressed Armenians" Javakhk.

Giorgi Mazniashvili