It is well known that all the numerous "autonomies" within the Soviet Union republics were initially regarded as "time bombs", any of which could be "detonated" by incorporating a process of separatism. Thus, the "architects of the collapse of the empire" planned a "neo-imperial" policy on the basis of separatism. In the Caucasus, imperial interests interceded with those of the Armenian lobby, which needed precedents for its "miatsum" - the annexation of Azerbaijani Karabakh to Armenia.

There were two such "ticking time bombs" in the Central Asian states. Kavkazplus has already written about one of them - Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in the article "Pamir and Zangezur - two key points of Eurasia" (http://kavkazplus.com/news.php?id=36444). However, there was also another autonomy - the Karakalpak ASSR within the Uzbek SSR.

As for the Karakalpaks, ethnically they are closest to the Kazakhs and Nogais, some consider them part of the Kazakh people. On the other hand, the Karakalpaks are very close to the Fergana Kipchaks, who joined the Uzbek nation. In reality, according to many historians, their origin is linked to the present long-suffering Ukraine, in particular Kiev.  They are one of the few Turkic peoples, who in the course of their history migrated for a considerable distance not from east to west, but from west to east.

From the historical chronicles it is known that in Kievan Rus the main military forces were Turks, who lived near Kyiv and to the south of it, and were mentioned in the chronicles as Torks, Berendeys and "Black klobuki" (their Slavic name) or Karakalpaks. It was they, in fact, who "invited" the princes to reign in Kiev, and without their consent no important political decisions were taken. The important role of karakalpaks (black klobuk) in the political life of the Kiev principality is evidenced by a phrase repeated many times in the annals: "All Russian land and the black klobuki (i.e. Karakalpaks)".

The original basis of the Karakalpaks was formed by the Turkic tribes of Torks and Oguzes, but subsequently more and more "waves" of numerous Kipchaks joined them and, as a result, today the language of the Karakalpaks belongs to the Kypchak subgroup of Turkic languages with significant Oguz components. In the course of historical migrations, the Karakalpaks also incorporated a significant Mongol component, in particular the Mangyt tribe.

The Karakalpaks, who lived near Kiev, offered the most fierce resistance to the Genghisid Empire, the troops of Batu Khan, defending Kiev for more than a week against the overwhelming force of the Empire. Historian Rashid-ad-din, describing the conquest of Kiev in 1240, writes: "Prince Batu with his brothers, Kadan, Buri and Buchek went on a march to the country of Russian and black hats (Karakalpak people - Ed.), and in 9 days took a great city of Russian, whose name was Mankerkan (i.e. Kiev)".

Kiev eventually fell, but the courage and bravery of the Karakalpaks was appreciated by the victors. A large part of the Karakalpak people were resettled closer to the centre of the Ulus Dzhuchi in the Volga region and joined the military and aristocratic structure of that state. The Karakalpaks who remained on the territory of present-day Ukraine became part of the Ukrainian people and formed the basis of the Ukrainian Cossacks. 

Regarding Karakalpaks who migrated to the Volga, they and their neighboring Nogais had to move a considerable distance again in the early 17th century under the onslaught of Oirat (Kalmyks). But if Nogays have mastered the steppes of the south of the modern Ukraine and Northern Caucasus, becoming in their masses the subjects of the Crimean khans, the Karakalpaks, a people who for a long time lived first on the banks of the Dnieper (near Kiev), and then on the banks of the Volga, mastered fishing, moved to another large and "fish" river Syrdarya and on the banks of the Aral Sea. Later, the Karakalpaks moved to the lower reaches of the Amu Darya, becoming subjects of the Khiva khans.

The Soviet authorities, trying to exploit the slightest differences to divide the Turkic peoples, made the Karakalpaks hostage to their "administrative games". In 1924, the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast was formed with its centre in the town of Turtkul, occupying the territory of the Amu Darya oblast of Turkestan ASSR and the Khojeli and Kungrad districts of the Khorezm Socialist Soviet Republic (the former Khiva Khanate).

On 16 February 1925, the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast within the Kyrgyz ASSR (later renamed the Kazakh ASSR) was officially established. On July 20, 1930, Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast was withdrawn from the Kazakh ASSR and became directly subordinate to the RSFSR. On March 20, 1932, AO was transformed into Kara-Kalpak ASSR within the RSFSR, and Nukus became the capital of the KKASSR. On 5 December 1936, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR (KKASSR) became part of the Uzbek SSR, and in 1964 it was renamed the Kara-Kalpak ASSR (KKASSR).

At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the same forces that were fomenting separatism in the South Caucasus also tried to foment Karakalpak separatism, using the desiccation of the Aral Sea as an excuse. They failed at that time, even despite attempts by the security services to establish an "independent" Karakalpakstan. In 1993 they signed a treaty making the Republic of Karakalpakstan an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan.

But this year, after the authorities published a draft amendment to the Constitution of Uzbekistan, on July 1-2, Karakalpakstan began to oppose two of the amendments, one on the abolition of the republic's sovereign status and the other on its denial of the right to secede from Uzbekistan. And certain forces attempted to foment separatist unrest. Fortunately, the Uzbek authorities took timely action and, first, the controversial amendments to the Uzbek Constitution were withdrawn and, second, the provocateurs and instigators of the unrest were detained and neutralised.

Who benefited from these riots can be seen with the naked eye. Certain forces in the Russian Federation are frightening the public with the 'great Turan'. And the same 'great Turan' is the main scarecrow of the Armenian lobby. An "order for "zones of instability" between Turkic countries of Central Asia has appeared, and in immediate proximity to promising trans-continental transit routes, including the Caspian and South Caucasus (including Zangezur corridor).

However, those who hoped to "blow up Turan" with a new hotbed of separatism and introduce Russian troops into the region (which would essentially become the backbone of the separatists) were abruptly forced to "back down". This was reported indirectly by the telegram channel "SVR General:

" Russian President Vladimir Putin held several meetings last weekend in different compositions and formats. The tense situation with the protests in Uzbekistan was Putin's agenda this weekend. For example, during meetings on the events in Uzbekistan Putin and his comrades discussed the possibility of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziev seeking help from Russia. Uzbekistan is not a member of the CSTO, although the organisation is sometimes still called the Tashkent Treaty. While Putin, at a meeting, raised the possibility of immediately reinstating Uzbekistan as a member of the CSTO, both Putin and the meeting participants agreed that no effective support for the Uzbek leadership using the Russian Armed Forces would be forthcoming, and the initiative was abandoned. All combat-ready troops are involved in the war in Ukraine, and the CSTO allies can provide real support only in moral terms. The possibility of sending about fifteen thousand Belarusian troops to Uzbekistan was discussed, provided that Uzbekistan was immediately reintegrated into the CSTO and if the Uzbek leadership applied for help, but Lukashenko, who was merely hinted at this possibility, became so alarmed that he flatly refused and even the next day publicly declared himself almost a party to the conflict in Ukraine so as not to have the troops taken away. An urgent meeting was called by Putin when he was informed that the president of Uzbekistan had spoken out in terms of the unrest in his country having been initiated from outside, a message the Russian president saw as a prologue to a request for help. Following the meetings, the Foreign Ministry was instructed to tell the Uzbek side gently, but emphatically, that asking for help was undesirable. In principle, the situation in Uzbekistan calmed down somewhat on Sunday morning, and Putin even summed up the meeting with the words "that seems to have blown over". In any case, as early as Saturday night, Putin made the decision, when Uzbekistan asked for help, to refuse, citing internal conflict and a lack of outside influence. Putin had just solved the problem of the Taliban's claims on Tajik territory by paying five billion dollars, effectively saving the CSTO, when Uzbekistan came under new attack. This will not save any dollars. Yes, and Vladimir Putin personally said when discussing the possibility of Uzbekistan's reinstatement within the CSTO: "The CSTO is a fiction, it is time to stop clinging to it. Whoever wants protection is welcome to Russia".

Obviously, certain "strategists" are wishful thinking here. Uzbekistan "willingly" did not intend to apply to Russia for help from the CSTO. Most likely, this appeal could have been "imposed" in approximately the same way as, for example, the Russian "peacekeepers" were imposed on Georgia in its time. At the same time, the Russian military originally supported the separatists in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Georgia at the time essentially lost the war to Russian interventionists and the separatists they supported and was forced to agree to covert occupation of its territories by Russia under the guise of "peacekeeping" which became clear and overt in 2008.

However, the main factor - the war in Ukraine and the Ukrainian people's resistance to Russian aggression - thwarted the plans of those who hoped to use the Karakalpak people as 'fuel' to foment strife between the countries of the Turkic world. Ironically, the Karakalpaks' distant "historical homeland" (and they have lived near Kiev for several centuries and may well consider Ukraine their historical homeland as well) helped them avoid the national catastrophe that provocateurs, instigators of separatism and external "well-wishers" were preparing for them.

Kavkazplus