Given the total dominance of the Armenian lobby in the highest echelons of power in the Russian Federation, it would be naïve to think that they would give up the "Artsakh" separatist project and claims on the Azerbaijani lands of Karabakh so easily. Even the fact that Russia, bogged down in the Ukrainian war, does not have the strength for "another front" does not stop them. The most important thing for them is to prevent the signing of the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which, we remind, is possible only on the basis of recognition of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Karabakh.

The revanchists and "Artsakh" separatists saw "a glimmer of hope" in the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Valdai on October 27, 2022 and made conclusions from these words that "Russia will not abandon Artsakh". They say we just need to "hold on a little longer" and wait for Russia to "deal" with Ukraine. Then, as in the early 1990s, Russia will "reclaim" Karabakh for the Armenians.

The fact that Armenia might lose everything, including its statehood based on historical Azerbaijani lands and centred in Irevan, does not seem to bother the "Artsakh" separatists or the Armenian lobby in Moscow at all in the event of a rejection of the peace agreement with Azerbaijan. After all, they already have a "back-up option" - "coastal Armenia" in place of separatist Abkhazia. As we know "Armenianization" of Abkhazia and resettlement of "Artsakh" Armenians there is actively pursued by the Union of Armenians of Russia (UAR) and the Armenian criminal capital, led by Ruben Tatulyan.

It's just Abkhazia that the Russian Armenian lobby will fight for "till the last drop of blood". It can surrender Yerevan (especially since Russian Armenians and their puppets like Zatulin are no longer allowed there), but not "favoured" by representatives of "the most ancient people" Georgian Sukhumi and Gagra.

In general, "either we go with Russia's help to "va bank" and take "Artsakh" or with the help of the same Russia we "evacuate" to Abkhazia" - this is roughly the strategy of the most radical and insane part of the Armenian nationalists. It is in this context that the separatists view the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Valdai Club meeting.

Vladimir Putin not only stressed that the so-called "Washington variant" of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan implies Baku's sovereignty over Karabakh, but also hinted that the "Russian variant" will include some "features" of Karabakh. What these peculiarities are can be guessed from the words of Vladimir Putin himself. He said that for years Moscow had been in dialogue with Yerevan, proposing to give Azerbaijan five districts around Nagorny Karabakh, leaving two districts to link with Karabakh, but Armenia "went its own way" and "this led to the situation that has developed to date".

That is, the Armenian revanchists and the Russian Armenian lobby (with whom this topic was undoubtedly agreed in Putin's speech) are given hope that if they "hang on to Russia" they can eventually, by unleashing a war, gain not only the territory of the former Nagorny Karabakh autonomy, but also the Lachin and Kelbajar districts. It is not quite clear how to do it, if Yerevan has already openly "dumped" Moscow and relies on Washington and Paris, and Russia has weakened because of the Ukrainian adventure and is leaving everything, including the South Caucasus. But it is precisely this kind of hope that is enough to slow down the signing of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia with all its might, including provocations.

Many Armenian political technologists, in particular Vigen Hakobyan, speak directly about this: "Putin tried to show that if the Armenian people and their leadership want to sign a document conceding the sovereignty of 'Artsakh', it will be a concession by the Armenian authorities and the people, as the people have chosen these authorities. If the people do not agree to this, then they should speak out for themselves, and Russia will try to support whatever the people and their leadership support". In his view, "the Russian president has also made it clear that if the issue of Karabakh's status is important to the people and authorities of Armenia, Russia is ready to take some action in this matter too, although it is difficult. But if the Armenian side is willing to reject the so-called 'Washington document,' Russia is ready to support them.

For Georgia, the Armenian nationalists' rejection of a peace deal with Azerbaijan is a huge risk. Russia intends to "support" revanchists and "Artsakh" separatists and not only that it can arrange another aggression against Georgia by punching a "military corridor" and supporting "Javakhk" separatists along the way. In case of failure of the revanchists' adventure, not a quiet and orderly resettlement but just a flight of Armenian settlers into Georgia's Abkhazia will begin.  And not 50 thousand "additional" Armenians from the liquidated "Artsakh" will move there, but all 500 thousand, if not more, including those from Zangezur and Yerevan. Naturally, in this case, there will be no place in Abkhazia not only for 300 thousand Georgian refugees, but also for remaining around 30 thousand Gali Georgians and about 60 thousand Abkhazians who are actually living in Abkhazia.

Grigol Giorgadze