Some serious people in Russia realize that the occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region and the attempt to create quasi-"independent" states there is a hopeless dead end. The separatists, despite huge infusions of cash from Russia into the occupied territories, could not build even a semblance of a self-sustaining economy.

As a result, the separatist Abkhazia lives not even at the expense of Russian budgetary injections, but at the expense of Georgia. For example, it consumes electricity from the Enguri hydroelectric power plant, without even bothering to carry out basic modernization of the electricity grid on its territory, due to which blackouts are common in the separatists. The Abkhazian consumer market is surviving at the expense of illegal trade with the rest of Georgia via the Enguri. The paradox is that despite rampant Georgianophobia real dependence of the separatists on Georgia is only growing.

There are already people in Russia who do not listen to the rabid Georgianophobic propaganda, who are afraid to face the truth and honestly say that "Abkhazia is Georgia". Among them is Tatyana Poloskova (Russian Federation) who is a Doctor of Political Science, a candidate of Philosophy, First Class State Councilor of the Russian Federation. Her article "Abkhazia is Georgia! (Struggle of the Mingrelian boys or who will untie the Abkhazian knot?)" published on the website of the scientific journal The Caucasus and the World:

"By the 20s of the XXI century it became clear that the experiment of building an "independent state" on the territory of Abkhazia torn away from Georgia and attached de facto to Russia was not a success. First of all, because this territory does not have the economic, financial and administrative capacity to ensure real sovereignty, which, incidentally, was publicly acknowledged by former Russian ambassador to Abkhazia Semyon Grigoriev. No one can seriously speculate about the development of Abkhazia, which for thirty years, in the presence of investment injections (and not only from Russia), could not rebuild most of the resort and transport infrastructure and remained dotted with ghost towns.

Moreover, despite Georgiaophobia (which, incidentally, is not characteristic today to the entire Abkhazian society), actively implanted in the mass consciousness myth-making about the causes and consequences of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, modern Abkhazia, in reality, was and remains Georgia on a number of indicators. By international law it is the territory of Georgia. Abkhazia as an "independent state" has been recognized by five countries. At that, three of them clearly did so under pressure from Russia.

That's Syria, once an oil-rich country that is now experiencing a terrible shortage of not only food but also gasoline, and is trying to cope with the dire consequences of war.  It's Nicaragua, with a perpetual president and his family business, skimming profits from both Russia and the US at the same time. 

And it's Venezuela, which is in a prolonged economic crisis. In the event of regime change in these countries, which will happen sooner or later, all agreements reached would be easily annulled, because Abkhazia is, under all international norms, the territory of Georgia. And its current government is not competent to decide and sign anything.

Oddly enough, Abkhazia continues to be part of Georgia in the economic aspect as well.  The Russian official publications point out that Russia is Abkhazia's main economic partner. Then comes Turkey. In reality, the main income of the local population comes from smuggling from Georgia. Up to 40 percent of industrial goods come from there. These goods do not go through customs, taxes are not paid, and all profits go to representatives of specific clans, which control the passage through the "porous" border. That is why the Abkhazian authorities are not interested in legalizing trade with Georgia, not for political reasons, but for fear of losing profits. There is a counter-stream of smuggling from Abkhazia to Georgia. These are honey, nuts and mandarins.

It should be noted that shadow economy in poor Abkhazia amounts to 3-4 billion rubles a year. Plus there is a system of taking bribes and "protection" of law enforcement officials, including those that were in place for years (in the Soviet period).

Drug trafficking in both directions is worth speaking about.  It should be noted that this topic is practically off-limits for Russian experts and journalists. There have been cases when Russian experts were warned in advance, and not from the Abkhazian side, not to show interest in this issue. And "do not dig in this direction.

Numerous Abkhazian political parties are fighting for access to the smuggling resource and for the opportunity to "saw" budgetary allocations from Russia, along with corrupt Moscow officials. It is not accidental that in the parliamentary elections of March 12th a certain United Council was put forward last year which included representatives of Cossack organizations. One of the points of the program of this council was legalization of trade with Georgia.

We should note that modern Abkhazia is not only economically closely tied to Georgia. Residents of Abkhazia, and not only from border areas, prefer to receive education and health services in Georgia. Numerous family ties cannot be ignored as well. Georgia has not gone anywhere from Abkhazia. On the contrary, its presence is quite visible. And it would be even more if it were not for the Russian military bases in Abkhazia. It is no coincidence that many Georgian politicians say that if Russia had not intervened, the negotiation process between Georgia and Abkhazia would have been much more effective.

The struggle between the ruling structures and the opposition (who are constantly changing places, and mostly through coups by kicking down windows and doors in government offices with a stool) is a struggle of the Mingrelian boys for access to a resource. For, over the decades, the change of clans and local elites has not brought cardinal changes in the lives of ordinary people. And now in terms of ethnic composition both in government and in opposition are dominated by Mingrelians. Including those who changed their names on the way and called themselves Abkhazians, despite surnames and prominence of their families. In case of change of the situation in the country they can just as easily change their names again.

So who will stop fighting of Mingrelian boys and unravel the Abkhazian knot?

Revocation of recognition is not a difficult procedure. But in our case, it is possible only with a change of power in Russia - we are talking about personalities. Let us note, however, that the current Russian elite is often guided not by geopolitical objectives, but by personal or corporate business interests. And if there are guarantees that these interests will be preserved, options are possible.

Among the Abkhazian opposition there are opponents of the current format of relations with Russia. Judging by social networks, there are also a significant number of those who believe that concessions to Russia in terms of harmonization of the law, in providing opportunities to acquire real estate on a common basis with citizens of Abkhazia cannot be made. But there is no real power in Abkhazia that would be oriented towards restoration of relations with Georgia, and even more so, towards its membership. And it's not just about the memory of the victims (on the Georgian side there were many more), but the fact that in case of return to Georgia they would have to give back the seized flats, houses and businesses to their rightful owners.

However, what is important is the following. The international situation in 2008 and in 2022 are completely different things. So are Russia in 2008 and now, when it is in the midst of a severe economic and domestic political crisis, moral disorientation of the population, and a severe reduction in the level of professional training of managerial personnel. In 2008, Russia, despite all the contradictions with its external partners, was quite contractual. And the leading powers did not make too drastic moves regarding Russia's participation in the events in Abkhazia.

The situation is different now.  Russia's real allies can be counted on the fingers of one hand. And whether they are allies or not? I, for example, do not share the exuberant enthusiasm about the outcome of the recent meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Yes, Russia hopes that China will support it in its conflict with NATO, but it is to China's advantage that Moscow's conflict with the West will continue and weaken it.

When talking about Abkhazia, experts often use the term "turbulence". But it is Russia that is in the turbulence stage now. And it is not a fact that it will emerge from this stage without serious losses. Do I believe in the possibility of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine? Of course I do. Especially since this conflict has already been going on. And not one year, but eight years. Since 2014.

However, I do not believe in an unconditional and easy victory for Russia. And even if I did, what difference would it make? War is blood, casualties and destruction.   War is an indicator of the helplessness and incompetence of diplomacy. But it is too late to talk about it.

The option of a local conflict with Ukraine as a test of Russia's real military capabilities is not so unlikely. And any local conflict could escalate into a bigger one.  There is another struggle for the redistribution of the already divided world, and Georgia could play a good game on this chessboard.

Tatiana Poloskova

D. in Political Science, Ph.D. in Philosophy, Counsellor of State, First Class, Russian Federation.