There are signs that a new area of instability may be emerging near the South Caucasus, with the same war in Ukraine "triggering" this instability. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, one of the main suppliers of food to the world market, has already led to a spike in grain prices. International experts are seriously talking about the threat of global hunger, especially in the food import-dependent countries of Africa and Asia.

Iran is also vulnerable to food insecurity. Its agricultural sector does not fully satisfy its domestic needs for grains and oilseeds; Iran used to buy a significant amount of them in Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, the government subsidizes the price of bread in Iran, but it does not solve the problem. There is a flourishing smuggling of subsidized bread to neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan, which makes Iran itself short of it.

Western sanctions on Tehran are preventing the country from earning extra money by exporting higher-priced energy resources to increase food purchases. As a result, food in Iran, including subsidised food, is rapidly becoming more expensive, and this has already provoked riots in the south-west of the country with looting of shops. The discontent has been provoked in particular by the fact that Iran has announced that the price of vegetable oil, chicken, eggs and milk will rise by 300% at once. So far, the authorities have managed to contain the protests through arrests and harsh measures, but it is clear that they could erupt with renewed vigour at any moment.

At the same time, Iran's geopolitical position is also becoming more complicated. Before the current Russian aggression against Ukraine, Iran and Russia acted in tandem in Syria in support of the Assad regime. However, Russia's military difficulties "on the Ukrainian front" forced the Kremlin to urgently redeploy troops there from Syria. As a result, Iran will bear the main "burden" in maintaining Bashar al-Assad's power from now on.

It is no coincidence that Bashar al-Assad paid his first visit to Iran in several years on 8 May 2022. In Tehran, he met with the leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi. It was Assad's first trip to Tehran since February 2019 and the second since the Syrian civil war, where the role of Iranian formations (primarily the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) in providing ground operations "under cover" of the Russian air force has been key.

Important for the Iranian troops in Syria in their interaction with the Russian contingent until recently was a kind of "protection from Israel. The fact is that Israel and Syria are still at war and Israel at every opportunity strikes both Syrian military installations and formations of Iranian forces and pro-Iranian Lebanese movement Hezbollah, allies of Bashar Assad. While there was a significant Russian presence in Syria, it somewhat "deterred" Israel, which tried to avoid direct conflict with Russia. And if, so to speak, there were both Iranian and Russian military personnel at the same military base, Israel tried to avoid strikes against it.

But, if most of the Russian force is moved from Syria to Ukraine and Assad has to rely on Iranian troops and Hezbollah, so Israel could step up dramatically and strike Iranian forces' positions in Syria. And a military conflict between Israel and Iran could lead to a new 'big war' in the Middle East.

Understandably, with the risks of military escalation in Syria and the prospect of war with Israel, as well as the explosion of the internal situation due to food problems for Iran, the issue of assistance to its Armenian "allies" recedes into the background. And it is exactly this help that the revanchists in Yerevan and unscathed "Artsakh" separatists hoped for, trying to prevent the opening of the Zangezur corridor. This even led last year to Iran's "rattling of arms" near the Azerbaijani border.

But when the problems in Syria and the internal political situation are expected to worsen, then Iran's cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey becomes vital. At least with regard to the prospects of supplying the European market with Iranian gas, which is supposed to "replace" Russian gas here. Thus, with Moscow, Tehran may become a competitor in this matter. And the U.S. could well play on this by "easing" sanctions against Iran against the background of their tightening against Russia. 

The Armenian lobby, which began to rely on Iran as a "counterweight" to Turkey and Azerbaijan after Russia's geopolitical positions faltered, is "out of luck" here. Today, normal cooperation with Baku and Ankara is more important than ever for Tehran.

Kavkazplus